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Think of the Children: How the Role of Students in 
the Classroom Informs Future Applications of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos in Academic Contexts 
INTRODUCTION 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 the Supreme Court determined that public 
employees may raise successful First Amendment speech claims only 
when speaking in their capacity as private citizens. Although this rule 
applies to almost all public employees, the Court specifically chose not 
to answer whether this rule applies to “speech related to scholarship or 
teaching” because there “is some argument that expression related to 
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s 
customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”2 In subsequent cases, the 
circuit courts have split concerning this potential exception to the 
Garcetti rule. Similarly, First Amendment scholars have disagreed on 
whether professors should have greater First Amendment protection 
than other public employees. 
Although several different arguments have arisen on both sides of 
the debate (mostly dealing with whether academic freedom should 
protect an academic institution or individual teachers), very little has 
been published by judges or scholars concerning how the role of 
students in the classroom should factor into determining whether 
professors’ speech should receive greater protection than the speech of 
other public employees. This relative silence is startling because 
students are clearly the primary targets of “speech related 
to . . . teaching” and “classroom instruction,” and consequently 
deserve some analytical attention. For example, if courts wish to justify 
giving additional protection to professors’ speech by stating that the 
classroom is “peculiarly the marketplace of ideas,” a justification the 
Supreme Court has previously stressed when discussing the First 
Amendment rights of teachers,3 it seems necessary that future courts 
 
 1. 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 425. 
 3. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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consider whether students are capable of truly participating in such a 
marketplace. Additionally, regardless of the justification for 
protecting professors’ speech, it is also necessary to determine 
whether students should be considered captive audiences, which 
would make their interests as listeners much more important in a First 
Amendment analysis. 
This Note contributes to the post-Garcetti debate concerning 
professors’ free speech rights by introducing the rights and roles of 
students to the discussion. Consideration of students’ rights and 
roles leads to the conclusion that professors should be given greater 
free speech protection for their speech related to scholarship but not 
for their speech related to teaching. Part II of this Note reviews the 
pertinent Supreme Court and circuit court cases on professors’ 
speech. Part II discusses the post-Garcetti scholarship that has 
considered whether Garcetti should apply to speech related to 
teaching and scholarship. Part III considers the relevance of students 
to the issue, identifying studies and other sources that demonstrate 
students’ general inability to participate in a marketplace of ideas 
within the classroom and their potential status as captive audiences.4 
Part IV proposes that, in light of these insights, future courts should 
separate speech related to teaching from speech related to 
scholarship for purposes of the Garcetti rule, exempting the latter, 
but not the former. Parts V and VI defend this proposal from likely 
criticisms and provide a concluding summary. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been very supportive of 
professors’ speech in the classroom. In fact, in 2003, the Court 
noted, “We have long recognized that, given the important purpose 
of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and 
thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”5 Despite the 
special niche that has existed for professors’ speech, the Garcetti 
 
 4. This paper will focus primarily on undergraduate students at colleges or universities. 
It is generally assumed, for purposes of this paper, that if undergraduate students are unable to 
participate in a marketplace of ideas within a classroom, elementary and secondary students will 
be at least as unable to participate therein. The same assumption is true for any captive 
audience argument. 
 5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
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Court’s hesitancy to shield such speech from its rule has opened the 
door for federal courts to reexamine whether professorial speech 
should receive any special treatment. This section will briefly examine 
some of the Court’s pre-Garcetti discussion of academic freedom6 
and the role Garcetti and its progeny have played in challenging the 
added protection that professors’ speech had acquired. 
A. Supreme Court Academic Freedom Cases 
One of the first opinions to suggest that professors’ speech 
might require greater protection than the speech of other public 
employees was Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the 1952 
case Wieman v. Updegraff.7 In Wieman, the Court ruled that an 
Oklahoma statute that required all public employees to take a 
“loyalty” oath violated the Due Process Clause.8 The oath required 
public employees to swear that they were not currently—nor had 
been within in the past five years—affiliated with any organization 
that had “been officially determined by the United States Attorney 
General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a 
communist front or subversive organization.”9 While concurring in 
the opinion, Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to emphasize why 
the statute’s application to university professors was particularly 
problematic.10 Justice Frankfurter summarized the problem as 
follows: 
It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-
mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible 
citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective 
public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and 
practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be 
exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry 
out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a 
responsible and critical mind are denied to them.11 
  
 
 6. The cases to be discussed have been selected based on their prominence in Justice 
Souter’s dissent in Garcetti and the majority opinion in Grutter. 
 7. 344 U.S. 183, 194–98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 8. Id. at 184 (majority opinion). 
 9. Id. at 186. 
 10. Id. at 194 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. at 196. 
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Although only one other Justice joined Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence, the essence of Frankfurter’s idea that teachers have the 
special responsibility to foster “habits of open-mindedness and critical 
inquiry” was later adopted by a majority of Justices as a principal 
reason for the academic freedom theory of professorial speech. 
Five years after Wieman, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of professorial academic freedom in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire.12 In Sweezy, the Court ruled that a district court had 
improperly held a university professor in contempt for refusing to 
answer the Attorney General’s questions concerning his associations 
with the Progressive Party and the content of several lectures he had 
provided to university classes.13 While the Court did not indicate 
how much scrutiny government action would be given when 
academic freedom was restricted,14 the Court emphatically stated in 
dicta that “[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders 
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our 
Nation,” and that “[t]eachers and students must always remain free 
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”15 
Despite this strong language, the Court did not rely on the academic 
freedom theory in its actual holding; instead, it found the actions 
unconstitutional on due process grounds.16 
The Court’s last landmark academic freedom case dealing with 
professors’ free speech rights occurred ten years after Sweezy. In 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,17 several faculty members of a public 
university challenged provisions of New York law that made 
“treasonous or seditious” utterances grounds for dismissal from 
 
 12. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
 13. Id. at 237–42, 249–50. 
 14. The Court declined to answer this question after concluding that the Attorney 
General’s questions violated the Due Process Clause because there was no government interest 
of any kind in having the Attorney General obtain information concerning the professor’s past 
speech and associations. Id. at 254–55. 
 15. Id. at 250. 
 16. Id. at 254–55 (“The lack of any indications that the legislature wanted the 
information the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner must be treated as the 
absence of authority. It follows that the use of the contempt power, notwithstanding the 
interference with constitutional rights, was not in accordance with the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 17. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 4:01 PM 
983 Think of the Children 
 987 
public service.18 After the faculty members failed to sign a certificate 
stating that they were not affiliated with the Communist party, in 
accordance with regulations passed pursuant to those provisions, 
each member became subject to dismissal; one of them, Keyishian, 
was denied a contract renewal as a result.19 The Court again noted 
the importance of academic freedom by stating that “[o]ur Nation is 
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,” and, more 
specifically, that “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which 
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through 
any kind of authoritative selection.’”20 As with the previous cases, 
however, the Court did not rely on the academic freedom theory in 
its holding but found that the relevant provisions were 
unconstitutional because they were vague and overly broad.21 
Two final cases merit some brief discussion because of their 
contribution to the general theory of academic freedom, even 
though they are not freedom of speech cases. In Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke22 and Grutter v. Bollinger,23 the 
Court addressed whether certain college and university admission 
programs were constitutional. Although coming to opposite 
conclusions for the individual programs at issue,24 the Court in each 
instance stated that “[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically 
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special 
concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to 
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its 
student body.”25 These cases indicated that academic freedom, at 
least sometimes, functions at an institutional level. This result has led 
to tension between the competing concepts of institutional academic 
 
 18. Id. at 593–95. 
 19. Id. at 592. 
 20. Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.N.Y. 
1943)). 
 21. Id. at 603, 608–10. 
 22. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 24. In Bakke, the admission program at issue was deemed unconstitutional because it 
functioned as an impermissible quota program. 438 U.S. at 319–20. In Grutter, the Court 
held that the admission program at issue was permissible because it did not function as a quota 
program. 539 U.S. at 335–36. 
 25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (endorsing that line from Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke). 
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freedom and the academic freedom of individual professors. This 
tension has come to the forefront of First Amendment jurisprudence 
in the wake of Garcetti. 
B. The Garcetti Rule and Subsequent Circuit Court Split 
Although Garcetti v. Cabellos did not directly involve academic 
speech, the Court’s opinion in Garcetti has given courts and scholars 
reason to debate how much First Amendment protection academic 
speech deserves. Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who 
wrote a disposition memorandum for his employer and participated 
as a witness for the defense in challenging a warrant.26 The attorney 
did not dispute that these actions were consistent with his official 
duties as a prosecutor.27 The attorney claimed that after taking these 
actions he was “subjected to a series of retaliatory employment 
actions.”28 
After the attorney’s employment grievance was denied based on 
a finding that his employer had not actually retaliated against him, 
the attorney filed a lawsuit claiming that his employer had violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments through the alleged 
retaliatory actions.29 The Court noted that its past decisions sought 
“both to promote the individual and societal interests that are 
served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public 
concern and to respect the needs of government employers 
attempting to perform their important public functions.”30 “With 
these principles in mind,” the Court concluded “that when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”31 Consequently, the 
attorney could not bring a First Amendment claim against his 
governmental employer because his speech (writing the memo) was 
pursuant to his official duties.32 
 
 26. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413–15 (2006). 
 27. Id. at 421. 
 28. Id. at 415. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 420. 
 31. Id. at 420–21. 
 32. Id. at 424. 
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After so ruling, the Court acknowledged Justice Souter’s dissent, 
which argued that the majority’s “decision may have important 
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional 
value.”33 In his dissent, Justice Souter used Keyishian and Sweezy to 
demonstrate that “[academic] freedom is . . . a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.”34 This special concern led Justice 
Souter to state, “I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean 
to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public 
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 
‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”35 In response to these concerns, the 
majority chose not to decide “whether the analysis we conduct today 
would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to 
scholarship or teaching.”36 As a result, Garcetti left circuit courts 
without any direction for how to handle future First Amendment 
claims brought by professors against their governmental employers. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that in the eight years since Garcetti, 
the circuit courts have split regarding whether the new public 
employee rule should extend to speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.37 
Two circuits, the Third and Seventh, have held that, despite the 
concerns expressed in Justice Souter’s dissent, the Garcetti rule 
applies to teachers and professors, at least in some circumstances. In a 
case where a tenured professor was allegedly disciplined for assisting a 
student athlete, the Third Circuit applied the Garcetti rule, but only 
after acknowledging Justice Souter’s academic freedom concerns and 
emphasizing that the professor’s actions “clearly were not ‘speech 
related to scholarship or teaching.’”38 While such an application does 
not address the ultimate issue, it does show that the Third Circuit is 
 
 33. Id. at 425. 
 34. Id. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 438 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). 
 36. Id. at 425 (majority opinion). 
 37. In addition to the circuit court split, two circuits have thus far explicitly declined to 
rule on the matter. See Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(recognizing the circuit split but declining to rule on the matter because the appellant did not 
raise the issue on appeal); Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court left “undecided 
the many questions relating to the concept and breadth of academic freedom” but choosing to 
not resolve the issue because the case did not “raise any serious questions” about the issue). 
 38. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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willing to extend the Garcetti rule to cover some speech from 
professors pursuant to their official duties. 
Going even further, the Seventh Circuit has been willing to apply 
Garcetti across the board.39 In Renken v. Gregory, the court applied 
Garcetti to a professor who was allegedly punished for speaking out 
to his university’s administration about the proposed use of grant 
funds.40 Despite extending Garcetti, the court did not explicitly 
inquire into whether the rule should apply to speech related to 
teaching and scholarship. This changed in Mayor v. Monroe, where 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment that 
applied Garcetti to a teacher whose contract was not renewed after 
she took a stance—during an elementary school class that she was 
teaching—against the United States’ military involvement in Iraq.41 
In affirming the judgment, the Seventh Circuit stated that Garcetti 
applied because “the school system does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ 
speech as much as it hires that speech.”42 Additionally, the court 
found that “pupils are a captive audience” because their education is 
compulsory and because they are likely to be indoctrinated.43 The 
court concluded “the first amendment does not entitle primary and 
secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive 
audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from 
the curriculum adopted by the school system.”44 
On the other side of the spectrum, the Fourth45 and Ninth46 
Circuits have held that the Garcetti rule does not apply to speech 
related to teaching and scholarship at any level. The Fourth Circuit 
exempted this speech simply because the Supreme Court “explicitly 
 
 39. See Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773–74 (7th Cir. 2008); Mayer v. Monroe 
Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 40. Renken, 541 F.3d at 774 ( “Renken was speaking as a faculty employee, and not as a 
private citizen, because administering the grant as a PI fell within the teaching and service 
duties that he was employed to perform.”). 
 41. 474 F.3d at 478, 480. 
 42. Id. at 479 (“Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she sells to her 
employer in exchange for a salary. A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can’t use it as a 
platform for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a traitor, when the 
approved program calls him one . . . .”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 480. 
 45. Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011); Lee 
v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 46. Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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did not decide whether this analysis would apply in the same manner 
to a case involving speech related to teaching.”47 The Ninth Circuit 
exempted the speech after conducting a thorough analysis of 
Garcetti and concluding that “if applied to teaching and academic 
writing, Garcetti would directly conflict with the important First 
Amendment values previously articulated by the Supreme Court.”48 
Specifically, the court noted that the academic freedom principles 
discussed in Keyishian, Sweezy, and Grutter could not be adequately 
preserved unless speech related to teaching and scholarship is exempt 
from the Garcetti rule.49 
The differences in the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits—and similarly the differences in the reasoning of the Third 
and Seventh Circuits—demonstrate that even where circuits agree 
concerning the proper application of Garcetti, they are still split as to 
why the conclusion is proper. This indicates a need for more 
guidance from the Supreme Court. Additionally, despite the many 
different reasons given for extending or not extending Garcetti in 
these cases, none of them include a detailed analysis of how the role 
of students in the classroom should factor into the determination. 
This is especially true with regard to the role of college students in 
the classroom. 
II. POST-GARCETTI SCHOLARSHIP 
Not only has the Garcetti opinion caused a division among the 
circuit courts, but it has also sparked a debate among legal scholars. 
Within the post-Garcetti scholarship addressing the rule’s application 
to speech related to scholarship or teaching, scholars generally fit 
into three categories:50 those who conclude that Garcetti should 
apply to both scholarship and teaching, those who maintain that 
Garcetti should not apply to either scholarship or teaching, and  
 
 
 47. Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 n.11; see also Adams, 640 F.3d at 562–64. 
 48. Demers, 729 F.3d at 1019. 
 49. Id. at 1019–20. 
 
 50. There is also a fourth category of scholars who do not proscribe a specific 
application but simply summarize the current state of the academic freedom theory. See, e.g., 
Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech in the Post-Garcetti World, 37 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2013). Due to its primarily descriptive nature, such scholarship is less 
applicable to the topic at hand and will not be summarized in this section. 
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those who contend that Garcetti should apply in some situations but 
not in others. 
Scholars in the first category, who would apply Garcetti to both 
scholarship and teaching, commonly argue that the academic 
freedom theory is not at odds with an extension of Garcetti because 
the theory covers only the academic institution, not individual 
professors.51 Some of these scholars also call into question the very 
idea that a classroom is “peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.”52 
Regardless of the reasoning, these scholars believe that speech related 
to teaching and scholarship is not sufficiently different from the 
speech of ordinary government employees to justify an exemption to 
the Garcetti rule. 
Scholars who contend against applying Garcetti to speech related 
to teaching and scholarship argue that application of the rule would 
prevent students from developing necessary skills and discourage 
professors from acquiring and teaching the cutting-edge knowledge 
that is vital to a proper education.53 These scholars also emphasize the 
aspirational language of the Supreme Court’s early academic freedom 
cases to demonstrate that all professorial academic speech deserves 
more First Amendment protection than the speech of other 
governmental employees.54 
 
 51. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Caballos 
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 645–49, 656 (2012) (arguing that Garcetti should at 
least apply to some speech related to academia and teaching because teachers must be 
evaluated on their speech for job performance). 
 52. Nancy J. Whitmore, First Amendment Showdown: Intellectual Diversity Mandates 
and the Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 321, 337–38 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“The academic marketplace functions neither as an economic 
marketplace driven by laws of supply and demand nor as a wide-open, uninhibited marketplace 
where multitudes of differing ideas can clash.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Hilary Habib, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Garcetti 
Era, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 535 (2013) (“A university is a setting unique from the 
public institutions like the DMV because, in a public university setting, professors’ First 
Amendment protection is crucial to engaging students in critical thought.”); Darryn Cathryn 
Beckstrom, Note, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech After 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1230 (2010) (“If [learning and entering into a 
marketplace of ideas] is the purpose of the modern public university, then government control 
over the ideas presented by academics makes no sense.”); David Fox, Note, Turning Up the 
Heat on Science: A New Threat to Academic Freedom, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 173, 193 (2011) 
(arguing that Garcetti should not apply to professors’ speech because “[c]ourts . . . cannot 
continue to take a back seat to these types of issues and hope that the scientists and public 
interest groups can adequately defend the freedom of inquiry”). 
 54. See, e.g., Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1219–20, 1238 (discussing the academic 
freedom principles articulated in Sweezy, Keyishian, Bakke, and Grutter and concluding that 
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Scholars in the final category have taken a more nuanced 
approach to whether Garcetti should cover speech related to 
teaching and scholarship. Instead of seeking a wholesale extension of 
or exemption to the rule, these scholars point out that in some 
contexts speech related to scholarship might deserve more First 
Amendment protection than speech related to teaching.55 
Specifically, these scholars argue that at elementary and secondary 
schools, speech related to teaching should be governed by Garcetti 
whereas speech related to scholarship might be exempted from such 
governance.56 Because “teaching and scholarship may often be 
intertwined at the university level,”57 and for reasons discussed 
later,58 these scholars decline to determine whether this division 
should apply to college professors and whether college professors’ 
academic speech should be governed by the Garcetti rule.59 
None of the scholars provide more than a minimal evaluation of 
what function the role of students in the classroom should play in 
determining whether Garcetti should apply to speech related to 
teaching and scholarship.60 This paper will argue that, after considering 
 
“[a]pplying the public employee speech doctrine to academic speech is inappropriate. When 
the government creates a public university, part of the bargain is academic freedom”); Erica 
Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”: Institutional Academic Freedom 
in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 249–52 (2011) (“Institutional 
academic freedom should not be used to squash the academic freedom rights of students or 
professors . . . . Academic freedom rights should protect professors above and beyond the free 
speech rights of individual employees, even when counterbalanced against institutional 
academic freedom.”); Lauren K. Ross, Note, Pursuing Academic Freedom After Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1253, 1281 (2013) (“[T]he Court should recognize a 
constitutional right to academic freedom that protects professors’ speech, as long as it is related 
to the academic purpose of the university.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply 
to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 697, 715 (2011) (“Proceeding under 
employee speech analysis, primary and secondary teaching should not receive an exemption 
from the Garcetti rule.”). 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 697 (concluding that Garcetti should apply to teaching but noting 
that “[d]ifferent sorts of First Amendment protection may be appropriate for scholarship than 
for teaching because scholarship requires the ability to freely pursue research and candidly 
share results, while teaching primarily involves the conveyance of information prescribed by the 
curriculum”). 
 57. Id. at 697. 
 58. See infra Part IV.B. 
 59. See, e.g., Forster, supra note 55, at 713–15. 
 60. See, e.g., Whitmore, supra note 52, at 377 (“Regardless of the outcome, students 
appear to have the least amount of freedom in the academic marketplace, and are the most 
vulnerable to the choices of others.”). 
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the role students play in the classroom, the separation of speech related 
to scholarship and speech related to teaching can—and should—apply 
to college professors in addition to elementary and secondary school 
teachers. 
III. STUDENTS’ ROLE IN SPEECH CONCERNING TEACHING AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
Prominently absent from every case and scholarly work discussed 
herein is an in-depth evaluation of how the interests of students should 
factor into whether the Garcetti rule should extend to speech related to 
teaching and scholarship. Although several cases have asserted that 
professors must have added First Amendment protection because of 
their special relationship with students,61 none have provided any 
analysis into whether that relationship actually functions in a manner 
that merits giving the professors’ speech added protection. This 
section argues that no such added protection should be granted 
because an undergraduate classroom is not a true marketplace of ideas 
and because undergraduates are effectively captive audiences.62 
A. Student Participation in the Marketplace of Ideas 
Courts63 and scholars64 alike have asserted that the classroom is a 
quintessential marketplace of ideas. Typically, the Supreme Court has 
used the marketplace of ideas metaphor within First Amendment 
cases to signify a public forum in which ideas can be freely presented 
and discussed, with the ultimate goal of ascertaining which ideas are 
 
 61. See supra Part I. 
 62. Admittedly, many of the factors that chill student speech in elementary, secondary, 
and undergraduate classrooms do not exist in post-graduate classrooms. For example, graduate 
students are generally older (and, consequently, their brains are more mature), they have more 
knowledge about the subjects they are pursuing, and they are likely to be less worried about 
what their peers may think of them. However, the fact that professors are still the ultimate 
judges over student work in graduate classes (in addition to other concerns such as the fact 
that students want to be able to obtain glowing letters of recommendation from their graduate 
professors) might have a sufficient chilling effect on student speech to make a separation 
between speech related to teaching and speech related to scholarship appropriate even in that 
context. 
 63. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (“The college classroom . . . is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967)) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249–50 (1957)). 
 64. See, e.g., Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1202. 
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true.65 Some critics have argued, however, that such a marketplace is 
a utopian idea that, in general, does not actually exist.66 
Whether this broad claim is true, several factors demonstrate 
that an undergraduate classroom is not a true marketplace of ideas. 
Among these factors are the impressionability of typical 
undergraduates, the inability of undergraduates to truly challenge 
their professors, and other features of undergraduate education 
that influence students to stay quiet in the classroom. These 
factors tend to create a classroom in which the professor’s word is 
completely authoritative and in which alternative ideas from 
anyone else are not likely to be presented in a persuasive manner. 
1. Impressionability of undergraduates 
The impressionable nature of an average-aged undergraduate is 
evident from neurological studies. For example, a Dartmouth 
College study indicated that the brains of 18-year-old college 
students are still going through a hard-wiring process.67 The study 
was conducted by using magnetic resonance imaging to track the 
changes of nineteen Dartmouth freshmen.68 The results suggested 
that the 18-year-olds showed “a dramatic burst of brain 
development . . . concentrated in the white matter, which is 
essentially the wiring that connects various parts of the brain.”69 
After comparing these results to the results found from a control 
group consisting of several 25- to 35-year-old students, one of the 
researchers affirmatively stated that “[t]he brain of an 18-year-old 
college freshman is still far from resembling the brain of someone in 
their mid-twenties.”70 
 
 65. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, 
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”). 
 66. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010). 
 67. Brain Changes Significantly After Age 18, Says Dartmouth Research, DARTMOUTH 
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~news/releases/2006/02/06.html; Steve 
Zind, Dartmouth Study Looks at Adult Brain Development, VERMONT PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 13, 
2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.vpr.net/news_detail/74456/dartmouth-study-looks-at-adult-
brain-development/. 
 68. Brain Changes Significantly After Age 18, supra note 67; Zind, supra note 67. 
 69. Zind, supra note 67. 
 70. Brain Changes Significantly After Age 18, supra note 67. 
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Other neuroscientists have indicated that the results of the 
Dartmouth study are not unique to young college students. Indeed, 
according to neuroscientist Sandra Aamodt, “brain scans show 
clearly that the brain is not fully finished developing until about age 
25.”71 Additionally, Aamodt noted that an 18-year-old’s brain is only 
about “halfway through [the] process” of developing its prefrontal 
cortex, which is “the part of the brain that helps you to inhibit 
impulses and to plan and organize your behavior to reach a goal.”72 
Other neurologists and psychologists have supported Aamodt’s 
assessment as well.73 A logical inference from these conclusions is 
that because college-aged brains are still developing, college students 
are more likely than individuals with fully developed brains to simply 
mimic the beliefs expressed by authority figures—such as 
professors.74 
Additional evidence in support of this inference derives from the 
fact that the ongoing brain development in 18- to 25-year-olds 
correlates with a significant shift in political leanings from college 
students’ freshman to senior years. For example, a national survey 
conducted by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program at the 
Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA suggested that, in 
 
 71. Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 11, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Lucy Wallis, Is 25 the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
23, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24173194 (reporting on the United 
Kingdom’s new policy that allows children psychologists to work with their patients until the 
age of 25, up from the age of 18); Elizabeth Williamson, Brain Immaturity Could Explain 
Teen Crash Rate: Risky Behavior Diminishes at Age 25, NIH Study Finds, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 
2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52687-
2005Jan31_2.html (discussing a study performed by the NIH’s Institute of Mental Health and 
UCLA’s Laboratory of Neuro Imaging that concluded that “the point of intellectual 
maturity . . . comes at about age 25”). 
 74. This seems to be a plausible conclusion because the abilities affected by the 
prefrontal cortex are those “such as planning, reasoning and problem solving.” Simon 
Gerhand, The Prefrontal Cortex—Executive and Cognitive Functions, 122 BRAIN 993, 994 
(1999) (reviewing THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX—EXECUTIVE AND COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS (A. 
C. Roberts et al. eds., 1998)), available at http://brain.oxfordjournals.org
/ content/122/5/994.full.pdf+html. Put simply, if a student does not possess fully developed 
reasoning and problem-solving skills, it seems unlikely that the student will be able to come up 
with alternatives to a professor’s ideas (or the student may simply not think through the 
professor’s ideas thoroughly enough to realize the professor might be wrong). Consequently, 
because college students—who pay to attend classes—presumably attend classes to learn and 
succeed (rather than rebel like students who are forced to attend classes), they are likely to 
simply parrot the professor instead of thinking of alternatives. 
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general, students become significantly more liberal during their four 
years in college.75 Some groups have used this conclusion to 
demonstrate that college professors use their authoritative capacity in 
the classroom to impose their liberal views on their students,76 
especially because it is unquestionably clear that a majority of college 
professors nation-wide characterize themselves as liberals.77 Other 
groups, however, argue that the political shifting of college students 
is not significantly more dramatic than the shift that occurs during 
the same ages among people who do not attend college.78 
Regardless of whether the views of college students change more 
dramatically than non–college students, what is clear is that many 
 
 75. AMY LIU ET AL., COOP. INST. RESEARCH PROGRAM AT THE HIGHER EDUC. 
RESEARCH INST. AT UCLA, FINDINGS FROM THE 2008 ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLLEGE 
SENIOR SURVEY (CSS): NATIONAL AGGREGATES 30 (2009), available at 
http://www.heri.ucla.edu/PDFs/pubs/Reports/CSS2008_FinalReport.pdf. Some of the 
significant statistics include that from the time students enrolled in college to the time they 
were ready to graduate, there was a 9% increase in students who characterized themselves as 
“Liberal of Far Left,” a 14% increase in students who believed that “[m]arijuana should be 
legalized,” a 13% increase in students who believed that “[homosexual] couples should have 
the right to legal marital status,” and a 12% increase in students who believed that “[a]bortion 
should be legal.” Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Jill Laster, College Makes Students More Liberal, but Not Smarter About 
Civics, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
http://chronicle.com/article/College-Makes-Students-More/64040/ (“The institute found 
that people who had attained at least a bachelor’s degree were more likely than Americans 
whose formal education ended with a high-school diploma to take a liberal stance on certain 
controversial social issues.”) (citing INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDIES INST., THE SHAPING OF THE 
AMERICAN MIND (2009), available at https://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/
2010%20Civic%20Lit%20Report%2012%2015%20FINAL_small_2_0.pdf). 
 77. Scott Jaschik, Moving Further to the Left, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 24, 2012), 
available at https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/10/24/survey-finds-professors-
already-liberal-have-moved-further-left (analyzing a 2010–2011 study that indicates that 62.7% 
of “full-time faculty members at four-year colleges and universities” identify as either “Far 
Left” or “Liberal”); see also Neil Gross, The Indoctrination Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, at 
SR12 (“[A] survey of more than 1,400 professors . . . conducted in 2006, covering academics 
in nearly all fields and in institutions ranging from community colleges to elite universities, . . . 
found that about half of the professors identified as liberal, as compared to just one in five 
Americans over all.”). 
 78. Scott Jaschik, Faculty Are Liberal—Who Cares?, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 27, 
2008), available at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/27/politics (describing 
a study that concluded that “college students graduate with a smaller share of people 
identifying as ‘far left’ than does the 18–24 year old cohort of the U.S. population” and 
providing a chart that demonstrates that 29.1% of college seniors self-identify as “liberal” 
compared to 28.7% of the “18–24 year old cohort in U.S.”). Admittedly, if this is true, then 
college aged individuals might be impressionable but not overly affected by professors. 
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college students do change their world-views.79 Consequently, it is 
not hard to imagine that anything a respected elder, such as a college 
professor, promotes to students at this stage in their lives could 
heavily influence the viewpoints they adopt and the decisions they 
make for better or worse.80 This impressionability, while not 
inherently problematic, should give some pause to courts when 
deciding how much leeway to give professors’ speech in a classroom. 
2. Inability to challenge professors 
On top of being generally impressionable, college students are 
also generally unable or unwilling to challenge the ideas their 
professors may promote. The most obvious problem in this regard is 
that professors are experts in their fields whereas college students 
often have little or no outside knowledge of the topics discussed in 
class. In other words, college students, in general, simply do not 
have enough information at their disposal to provide a compelling 
opinion that contradicts the opinion of the professor. 
Even if students did have sufficient information to challenge a 
professor’s opinion in class, many students will be discouraged from 
doing so for one simple reason: the professor controls their grades. 
There is evidence that students frequently care more about the 
grades they earn than about actually learning or ascertaining the 
truth. For example, some teachers admit that they do not believe in 
the grading system precisely because they believe that grading is a 
“flawed system that teaches students to only do the minimum to get 
a certain grade.”81 The incentive to focus on grades stems from the 
reality that a student’s ability to obtain admission into a desirable 
graduate program82 or to acquire a desirable job83 largely depends on 
 
 79. Although this susceptibility could potentially be explained through other factors, 
impressionability seems to be the most plausible explanation (for the neurological reasons 
already discussed). 
 80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 81. See, e.g., Trent M. Kays, Grades Are Arbitrary, Learning Is Not, MINN. DAILY (Nov. 
21, 2011), http://www.mndaily.com/2011/11/21/grades-are-arbitrary-learning-not. 
 82. See, e.g., Claudine Vainrub, The Importance of Grades for College, EDUPLAN (Sept. 
21, 2010), available at http://www.eduplan.us/the-importance-of-grades-for-college/ 
(explaining that when applying for either college or for a graduate program “if your grades 
aren’t great, everything else will have to be”). 
 83. David Koeppel, Those Low Grades in College May Haunt Your Job Search, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/31/jobs/31gpa. html
? pagewanted=all; Ken Sundheim, The Important of Getting Good Grades in College, 
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the grades the student achieves in college. Students know that they 
cannot fully indicate (nor could employers or admission officers 
discern) everything they have learned in college. Instead, they must 
use grades as a proxy.84 To borrow an oft-used First Amendment 
phrase, this obsession with grades coupled with the knowledge that a 
professor’s impression of a student directly affects that student’s 
grades certainly “chills”85 the speech of many students who may 
otherwise be capable and willing to challenge the ideas their 
professor promotes.86 
3. Other factors that keep students quiet 
In addition to their comparative lack of knowledge and their 
dependence on professors in the grading system, students may 
refrain from challenging their professors’ ideas in the classroom for 
other reasons. After struggling to figure out how to help quiet 
students speak up in class, one university professor decided to survey 
the self-described quiet students in her class to determine why they 
chose to stay silent during class.87 To her surprise, many of their 
 
EXAMINER.COM, (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/article/the-important-of-
getting-good-grades-college. 
 84. Admittedly, many people also try to emphasize to college students that grades are 
ultimately not that important; however, while the importance of grades is almost certainly 
evident to most students by the time they are in college (even without being counseled on 
their importance), the fact that there is so much emphasis on why grades are not ultimately 
important actually seems to indicate that grade obsession is a very real thing. See, e.g., Lauren 
Landry, Why Grades Just Don’t Matter, BOSTINNO, (July 30, 2012, 11:50 AM), 
http://bostinno.streetwise.co/2012/07/30/why-grades-just-dont-matter/ (“[Grades are] 
[t]he singular thing every student strives for.”); Lauren Schuhmacher, Why Grades Don’t 
Really Matter That Much After All, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-schuhmacher/why-grades-dont-really-ma_b_2
682922.html (“The current perception of the importance of grades in academia dumbfounds 
me, because I think that by caring too much about grades, most students are missing the 
point of education.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 620 n.9 
(2003) (“The Court has long cautioned that, to avoid chilling protected speech, the 
government must bear the burden of proving that the speech it seeks to prohibit is 
unprotected.” (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958))). 
 86. Truly, some professors may value opposing opinions and reward students who 
explore them, but likely not most professors, at least based on this author’s experience. 
 87. Mary M. Reda, What’s the Problem with Quiet Students? Anyone? Anyone?, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 5, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Whats-the-Problem-With-
Quiet/124258/. 
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reasons for staying quiet had nothing to do with grades.88 The 
professor discovered that students “also consider their self-images, 
their knowledge, and their comfort levels with criticism and 
confrontation in the classroom setting when deciding whether to 
speak or be silent.”89 The quiet students in her class, who are likely 
similar to quiet students elsewhere, were particularly concerned that 
a misstatement or a misunderstanding in the classroom would create 
an unfixable rift between the student who misspoke and the rest of 
the class.90 This means that even if a student is not susceptible to 
changing her opinion based on the views of an authority figure, has 
enough knowledge on the subject to adequately challenge the 
professor, and is not worried about the potential negative effect on 
her grade such a challenge may have, that student may still not 
challenge the professor’s viewpoints in the classroom because the 
challenge may give her peers a negative impression of her. 
All of these hindrances to student challenges to professors’ 
viewpoints illustrate that a college classroom is not a true 
marketplace of ideas because the truth of the views promoted by the 
professors will rarely be meaningfully challenged.91 Thus, although a 
college classroom is undoubtedly a very important learning 
environment, it is not a place where multiple parties are engaging 
each other with speech and counter-speech to actively ascertain the 
truth. Consequently, future courts should not justify a teaching 
exception to the Garcetti rule by stating that the classroom, even in a 
college or a university, is peculiarly a marketplace of ideas. 
B. Students as Captive Audience 
Students are also relevant to the question of professorial speech 
rights for another reason: students may constitute a captive audience 
 
 88. Id. She also noted, however, that “[t]he more pressure a professor creates through 
grading class participation, the more complicated it becomes for students to speak.” Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. In addition to the factors laid out here, legal scholars have also noted that a 
teacher’s ability to start and stop discussion at a whim and her ability to potentially humiliate 
the students are also factors that lead to the inevitable conclusion that added protection to 
teachers’ (and, similarly, professors’) classroom speech cannot be justified by stating that the 
classroom is peculiarly a marketplace of ideas. See, e.g., Howard O. Hunter, Curriculum, 
Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1, 62 (1983). 
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even at the collegiate level. Past Supreme Court rulings have made 
clear that otherwise protected speech may be restricted due to the 
captive nature of the audience.92 Courts have already indicated that 
elementary and secondary students (often referred to as pupils) 
constitute captive audiences in certain contexts,93 but no court has 
held the same concerning college students. Due to the increasing 
economic pressure to attend college and due to the mandatory class 
requirements imposed by colleges and universities, in many ways 
college students are effectively a captive audience as well. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court, in other First Amendment 
contexts, has already shown a willingness to imply that an audience is 
captive even when members of the audience are not legally required 
to attend.94 
1. Differences between pupils and college students 
Many scholars have argued that college students are not a captive 
audience, based on differences between college students and pupils, 
who clearly qualify as captive audiences.95 The most obvious 
difference that scholars have identified is that “[u]nlike college and 
university students, pupils are compelled to attend school until a 
specified age.”96 College attendance is much more voluntary, at least 
in a legal sense, than elementary school or secondary school 
attendance. Other differences include the following: pupils are 
minors and minors deserve a much higher level of protection from 
certain types of speech;97 college students have a greater opportunity 
 
 92. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000); Rowan v. U.S. Post 
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (validating a statute that allowed people to remove 
their names from a mailing list for erotic materials). 
 93. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Muller ex rel. 
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1541 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Children in public 
schools are a ‘captive audience’ that ‘school authorities acting in loco parentis’ may ‘protect.’” 
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684)). 
 94. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992) (“Attendance may not be 
required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the 
graduation exercise in any real sense of the term ‘voluntary,’ for absence would require 
forfeiture of those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all 
her high school years.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 54 (2008). 
 96. Rachel F. Moran, Let Freedom Ring: Making Grutter Matter in School Desegregation 
Cases, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 503 (2009). 
 97. See Forster, supra note 55, at 714 (noting that pupils should be treated differently 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 4:01 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1002 
to respond to teachers’ speech;98 college students select which school 
to attend;99 and college students are not legally required to be at 
certain parts of their campus at any given time, whereas elementary 
and secondary school students are required to be specific places on 
campus during the day.100 While these differences may appear to 
justify greater protection from unbridled speech for pupils than for 
college students, the following subsections demonstrate that these 
differences are not as drastic as they may seem. 
2. Mitigating the differences 
The perceived differences between pupils and college students 
fade to some extent on closer examination. First, as has already been 
discussed, the majority of college students have not yet mentally 
developed into mature adults.101 Consequently, classifying high 
school students as “minors” and 18- to 22-year-old college students 
as “adults” might create an improper understanding. Indeed, in 
addition to neuroscientists, car rental services102 and psychologists103 
 
than college students because “[t]he ability of students to think for themselves increases with 
age, whereas younger students are more likely to accept whatever a teacher says as true.” 
(citing Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
banc))). 
 98. Daniel J. Trainor, Native American Mascots, Schools, and the Title VI Hostile 
Environment Analysis, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 971, 989–991 (1995) (“Primary and secondary 
school officials restrict student speech, but college and university officials do not.”). 
 99. Moran, supra note 96, at 503 (“Even when families are dissatisfied with their local 
school, they may find it difficult to move to another district or pay tuition for a child to attend 
a private institution.”). 
 100. See Greg C. Tenhoff, Censoring the Public University Student Press: A Constitutional 
Challenge, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 511, 535 (1991) (“Moreover, university students are not a 
captive audience as are high school students. Students are not required to attend college, nor 
are they required to be on campns [sic] during any period of time.”). But see About Pepperdine, 
PEPP. UNIV., http://www.pepperdine.edu/about/pepperdine/christiantradition/ (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2013) (“Each semester, all undergraduates [attending Pepperdine] are required to 
attend 14 programs in the Convocation Series, which are activities aimed at building Christian 
faith, affirming Christian values, or addressing ethical and moral issues within a Christian 
worldview posed by current events.”). It is important to note that Pepperdine is a private 
university and, consequently, would not be affected by an extension of the Garcetti rule. 
 101. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 102. Robin Marantz Henig, Why Are So Many People in Their 20s Taking so Long to Grow 
Up?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/
magazine/22Adulthood-t.html?pagewanted=all (“[S]cientists found the children’s brains were 
not fully mature until at least 25. ‘In retrospect I wouldn’t call it shocking, but it was at the 
time,’ Jay Giedd, the director of the study, told me. ‘The only people who got this right were 
the car-rental companies.’”); see also Kristen Hamlin, How to Rent a Car When You Are Under 
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also suggest that 25 years of age might be a better line to distinguish 
between minors and adults. Moreover, the prior discussion about the 
classroom as a marketplace of ideas demonstrates that college 
students actually have only a minimally greater opportunity—if 
greater at all—to challenge their teachers’ speech than do pupils, at 
least in the classroom.104 College students are also similar to pupils in 
other ways: for example, they are compelled, at least financially, to 
attend school and—once they begin attending—to be in certain 
places at certain times. 
a. College students are financially compelled to attend class. Even 
though college students are not legally compelled to attend classes as 
pupils are, they are, to a large extent, financially compelled to attend. 
Findings from the Bureau of Labor Statistics demonstrate that, for 
persons 25 years old and older, college graduates have significantly 
more—and significantly higher paying—jobs available to them than 
people with only a high school diploma.105 According to the Bureau, 
the unemployment rate of individuals with just a high school 
diploma exceeds that of individuals with a bachelor’s degree by 3.8 
percentage points.106 Additionally, individuals with just a bachelor’s 
degree make an average of $21,528 more per year than high school 
graduates.107 Considering high school graduates make only $33,904 
per year on average,108 this is a significant difference. 
Other statistics further demonstrate the increasing pressure to 
attend college in the current job market. The percentage of high 
school graduates who attend college has never been higher than 
during the past decade. That percentage reached an all-time high in 
2009 at 70% and is still at 66% as of 2013.109 Part of the reason for 
 
25, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usatoday.com/rent-car-under-25-61224.html (last visited 
Sept.9, 2014) (noting the difficulty and great expense of renting a car if you are under 25 due 
to rental companies’ policies). 
 103. Wallis, supra note 73. 
 104. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 105. Employment Projections: Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational 
Attainment, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (indicating that high school graduates make an average of $651 a week). For 
some perspective, the poverty line for a single-person household in the United States is 
$11,490. 2013 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm#thresholds (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 108. Employment Projections, supra note 105. 
 109. Most High School Grads Go to College in 2012; Drop-Outs Face Unemployment, 
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these high numbers might be that high school students know it is 
difficult for them to obtain a job if they do not have a college 
education. After all, 34% of students who graduated from high school 
last year and did not enroll in college are currently unemployed.110 
Additional findings from past censuses show that the percentage of the 
national population age 25 and older who have obtained at least a 
bachelor’s degree has increased from 4.6% in 1940 to 30.9% in 
2012111 and that “[a]dults with bachelor’s degrees in the late 1970s 
earned 55 percent more than adults who had not advanced beyond 
high school. That gap grew to 75 percent by 1990—and is now at 85 
percent.”112 All of these statistics tend to show that high school 
graduates are now expected—and almost financially required—to 
attend college, a fact that was not always true. 
b. College students are bound by graduation requirements. 
Although college students admittedly have more liberty than pupils 
to select the school they will attend, once they make that choice, 
they face specific requirements that they must meet in order to 
graduate. These requirements, while also technically followed 
voluntarily, include mandates on where students need to be on 
campus at specific times.113 Often, students will have to take a 
specific class that is taught by only one professor at limited times. 
Legal scholars have noted that students in this type of class are 
particularly likely to experience the same type of captivity that is 
experienced by pupils.114 While students can choose to enroll but 
 
EXAMINER (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/most-high-school-grads-go-
to-college-2012-drop-outs-face-unemployment. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Figure 2: Percent of Population Age 25 and Over by Educational Attainment: 1940–
2012, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/
education /data/cps/historical/fig2.jpg (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). The percentage of people 
with only a high school degree or some college experience in the same timeframe increased 
from 19.6% to 56.7%. Id. 
 112. G. Scott Thomas, Earnings Widen Between College and High School-Only Grads, BUS. 
JOURNALS (Dec. 28, 2012, 2:30 PM EST), http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/on-num
bers/scott-thomas/2012/12/grads-earn-85-more-than-those-without.html?page=all. 
 113. For example, class attendance and adherence to specific time and place requirements 
for exams will be required for a passing grade in many classes. 
 114. See, e.g., Lisa M. Woodward, Collision in the Classroom: Is Academic Freedom a 
License for Sexual Harassment?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 667, 682 (1999) (citing Arthur L. 
Coleman & Jonathan R. Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: Harmonizing Rights of Free Speech and 
Freedom from Discrimination on University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L. 91, 102, 117 (1996)) 
(“Students in a college or university classroom setting may well constitute a captive audience, 
particularly if the class is required for graduation and no other sections are available.”). 
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not attend those “mandatory” classes, such a choice will inhibit 
their ability to secure a good grade in the course, to obtain a much-
needed letter of recommendation from the professor teaching the 
course, or even to graduate from college at all (if they fail the course 
as a result). Due to the financial pressure to obtain a degree,115 and 
to get good grades while doing so,116 the choice to not attend these 
required classes is more theoretical than real. For similar reasons, 
college students may arguably constitute a captive audience even in 
elective classes, especially if those classes help the students satisfy 
minimum credit requirements for graduation. 
While there may still be some differences between pupils and 
college students that have not been mitigated, it is evident that the 
two groups are not too dissimilar. In fact, the two groups are similar 
enough that it seems reasonable to assert that college students, at 
least in some scenarios, constitute a captive audience during class. 
Even if courts are not willing to rule that college students are a 
captive audience, the fact that college students are so similar to 
pupils coupled with the fact that a college classroom is not a true 
marketplace of ideas should lead courts to conclude that the 
classroom speech of college professors (as well as that of elementary 
and secondary school teachers) should not be exempt from the 
Garcetti rule. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: SEPARATE TEACHING AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
The conclusion that Garcetti should cover professors’ classroom 
speech does not answer whether Garcetti should cover professional 
speech related to scholarship. At first glance, it may seem that the two 
words are inseparable—and thus deserve the same judicial 
treatment—because they stem from much of the same research and 
preparation. However, a more thorough consideration shows that the 
two can be separated in the following manner: teaching is professors’ 
speech to students in a classroom or in their offices concerning 
coursework, and scholarship is professors’ speech to other professors 
outside the classroom setting. By separating the two terms in 
elementary, secondary, and collegiate settings, Garcetti can apply (or 
not apply) to speech related to teaching and scholarship in a manner 
 
 115. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 116. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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that accommodates the principles behind the academic freedom 
theory and the interests of students. 
A. Speech Related to Teaching 
When the definition of teaching is narrowed to include only 
professors’ classroom speech, many of the arguments against 
extending Garcetti to speech related to teaching lose a lot of 
traction. This is especially true in light of the analysis concerning the 
rights and roles students maintain in a classroom.117 Because the 
arguments appear to be less compelling with regard to a typical 
classroom setting, it seems less necessary to exempt classroom speech 
from the Garcetti rule.118 
While this conclusion may seem contrary to the academic 
freedom theory, it is not clear that the academic freedom theory was 
ever intended to cover individual professors or even their classroom 
speech. Indeed, the most recent major Supreme Court cases to invoke 
the academic freedom theory have protected the academic freedom of 
academic institutions generally, not individual professors.119 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has also held that professors do not have a 
constitutional right to participate in university policy decisions,120 and 
several circuit courts have affirmatively held that academic institutions 
(and not individual teachers) have the right to set curriculum.121 
 
 117. For example, because the classroom is not the type of place where students are 
willing and able to challenge their professors’ theories, it seems that the classroom is not a 
setting where students can freely inquire and evaluate; nor is it a marketplace of ideas. See 
generally supra Part III. 
 118. Although individual teachers’ classroom speech should be covered by the Garcetti 
rule, courts will not be discouraged from continuing to allow academic institutions to 
determine curriculum without outside governmental interference. In this way, some aspects of 
a professor’s classroom speech will be exempted from the Garcetti rule, at least insofar as the 
institution allows the individual professor to participate in determining the curricula. See Minn. 
State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984) (ruling that professors do not 
have a constitutional right to participate in their academic institution’s policymaking decisions 
by stating that “[f]aculty involvement in academic governance has much to recommend it as a 
matter of academic policy, but it finds no basis in the Constitution”). 
 119. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978). 
 120. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 465 U.S. at 288. On the other hand, as some 
scholars have pointed out, even without a constitutional right, “shared governance and 
academic decisions often involve faculty input into policies and decisions of the institution.” 
Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak no Evil: Academic Freedom and the Application of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 146 (2009). 
 121. See, e.g., Grossman v. S. Shore Pub. Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1097, 1100 (7th Cir. 2007) 
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Determining that a professor does not have constitutional protection 
from her governmental employer for her classroom speech does not 
conflict with these rulings and would support the notion that academic 
institutions should ultimately be in charge of determining who should 
be admitted into their classrooms122 and what should be taught 
therein.123 Even under this proposal, however, individual professors are 
not entirely unprotected because their classroom speech can be shielded 
from institutional interference through tenure124 and through other 
means, such as state constitutional or statutory law.125 As a result, First 
Amendment interests are protected in other ways. 
B. Speech Related to Scholarship 
Unlike professors’ speech related to teaching, their speech related 
to scholarship should not be governed by the Garcetti rule. When 
scholarship is defined as speech among professors outside of a 
classroom, which includes a professor’s individual research, there are 
two factors that dictate that Garcetti should not apply to such speech: 
first, scholarship, unlike teaching, is “peculiarly a marketplace of 
 
(quoting Palmer v. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1979)) (“The First Amendment is 
‘not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular content.’”); 
Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370–71 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 813 (1998) (“We agree with Plato and Burke and Justice Frankfurter that the school, not the 
teacher, has the right to fix the curriculum.”); Bishop v. Arnov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1077 (11th Cir. 
1991) (“The University’s conclusions about course content must be allowed to hold sway over an 
individual professor’s judgments.”); Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 426 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(“And matters such as course content, homework load, and grading policy are core university 
concerns, integral to implementation of this policy decision. . . . The first amendment does not 
require that each nontenured professor be made a sovereign unto himself.”). See also Tepper, supra 
note 120, at 180 (“[T]hough initially concerned with individual faculty rights, academic freedom has 
taken on a decidedly institutional character: it protects the freedom of the institution to decide 
internal matters including selection of personnel, curriculum, and teaching methods.”). 
 122. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 123. See cases cited supra note 121. 
 124. After earning tenure, professors’ “service should be terminated only for adequate 
cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circumstances because of 
financial exigencies.” AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & ASS’N OF AM. COLLS., 1940 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure. 
 125. See infra Part V.B (explaining in part the pressures faced by an institution that may 
indirectly protect professors’ speech rights); See also Tepper, supra note 120, at 130 (“[W]hile 
academic freedom may be best protected by tenure, other mechanisms apart from federal 
constitutional protection may offer some shelter, including state constitutional and statutory 
law, freedom of contract and collective bargaining provisions, and academic policy.”). 
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ideas”; and, second, many of the academic freedom principles 
articulated by the Supreme Court can be preserved by solely 
protecting professors’ scholarship. 
1. Scholarship is peculiarly a marketplace of ideas 
Most of the barriers that prevent a classroom from being a true 
marketplace of ideas are absent in the realm of scholarship. For 
example, professors are not dependent on grades determined by 
other professors in their field. It is true that professors are reliant 
upon each other to some degree (e.g., peer reviews and networking), 
but there is generally a level of respect among professors that makes 
this reliance less speech-chilling. Similarly, professors are generally 
experienced enough to no longer be as impressionable as a typical 
student. While there are certainly exceptions, most professors are 
older than 25, and those who are not have already demonstrated a 
high level of intellectual maturity by going through all the steps to 
become a professor at a young age. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, professors have enough 
knowledge concerning their subject matter to truly challenge other 
professors in their field. The same qualifications that make professors 
vastly more capable of presenting a plausible theory than students 
also enable professors to adequately challenge each other’s theories. 
In other words, professors in similar fields will know enough about 
the subject to sift out flaws or false assumptions in each other’s 
theories.126 This mutually held skill creates an environment in which 
truth can be more readily ascertained than in just about any other 
setting, thus establishing a true marketplace of ideas that may deserve 
a special niche in First Amendment jurisprudence.127 
2. Academic freedom principles in scholarship 
Not only does exempting speech related to scholarship satisfy the 
Court’s desire to protect speech in settings that are “peculiarly the 
 
 126. See, e.g., Quality and Value: The True Purpose of Peer Review, NATURE (2006), 
available at http://www.nature.com/nature/peerreview/debate/nature05032.html (“At its 
best, the peer review system provides not only expert advice, but also a strong incentive for 
authors to heed the advice and to improve the paper.”). 
 127. Other such settings may include debates among informed politicians or in brain trusts. It is 
worth noting that these settings usually also consist of people who are considered to be experts in 
their fields. 
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marketplace of ideas,” but it also appears to independently advance 
other academic freedom principles. As discussed above, it is 
debatable whether the academic freedom theory should protect the 
speech of individual professors at all.128 However, when the Court 
has indicated that the speech of individual professors might be 
entitled to special First Amendment protection, it has done so in a 
manner that peculiarly points towards protecting scholarship. Most 
notably, the Court has frequently recognized the importance of 
allowing professors to explore their fields of study and remain 
uninhibited in their own search for truth.129 For reasons mentioned 
in the previous subsection,130 it is clear that a professor’s exploration 
and pursuit of truth will usually be more fruitful when she is 
conducting research, writing scholarly pieces, or conversing with her 
peers than when she is teaching her students. 
Therefore, because academic freedom principles can be 
adequately advanced by protecting only speech related to scholarship 
and because speech among professors—unlike speech between 
professors and students in a classroom—is peculiarly a marketplace of 
ideas, speech related to scholarship should be exempted from the 
Garcetti rule, whereas speech related to teaching should not be. 
V. RESPONSES TO LIKELY CRITICISMS 
Although it has only been seven years since Garcetti, there has 
already been enough discussion of the case’s potential implications to 
recognize some major criticisms of the proposed solution. The three 
most apparent criticisms are that, although the solution may sound 
good in theory, it will be difficult to separate teaching from 
scholarship in practice; that a regulated classroom will prevent 
 
 128. See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Teachers and 
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Teachers . . . must be exemplars of open-
mindedness and free inquiry.”). On a related note, it is also arguable that a student’s ability to 
freely inquire would actually be inhibited by exempting speech related to teaching from the 
Garcetti rule because of the same factors that indicate that the classroom is not a marketplace 
of ideas. For example, if a professor decided, against her employer’s will, that she was not 
going to teach all viewpoints on a particular topic, the students’ information stream would be 
stifled and they would likely not be able to challenge the professor to teach the withheld 
information. 
 130. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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students from obtaining the cutting-edge information they need and 
pay for; and that the government should not restrict the speech of 
those it funds to convey a private message (i.e., professors). 
A. Professors’ Teaching Stems from Scholarship 
Scholars have noted that, at least at a collegiate level, it might be 
impractical to separate teaching from scholarship.131 Specifically, 
critics may claim, professors necessarily use the fruits of their 
scholarship as part of their curriculum.132 An inability to do so would 
prevent professors from fully presenting pertinent materials to their 
students. Moreover, if curriculum and teaching decisions are 
protected only at a university level, the limitation on professors’ 
speech would expand to the point that a professor may never know 
which viewpoints she is allowed to present to a class—a completely 
speech-chilling result. 
While such an outcome seems somewhat troubling, it can be 
easily prevented. Colleges have a vested interest in a professor’s 
scholarship and in her teaching because a college’s reputation among 
scholars and current and prospective students largely depends on the 
quality of both types of speech. Additionally, if a professor is 
regarded as a prominent scholar in a particular field, it seems 
counterproductive for a college to stifle that professor from sharing 
her beliefs with her students. Accordingly, the ideal situation to 
avoid conflicts between professors and their colleges would be for 
colleges to allow professors to present many different ideas—
including the fruits of their own scholarship—in the classroom, so 
long as the professors refrain from promoting (as opposed to merely 
presenting) any of those ideas. While students will certainly 
understand that the professor believes the viewpoints that she 
expresses in her work product, that understanding will not prevent 
 
 131. See, e.g., Forster, supra note 55, at 697 (“Although teaching and scholarship may 
often be intertwined at the university level, the same cannot usually be said of public primary 
and secondary schools.”). Forster does not go into any depth beyond this statement about the 
two types of speech being intertwined, so the argument in this paper is merely inferential. 
Additionally, because Forster specifically stated that this argument did not readily apply to 
elementary and secondary school teachers, the response to this argument will focus solely on 
college professors. 
 132. Additionally, it should be noted that sometimes professors teach seminars that 
explore the issues they are writing about. Admittedly, the teaching in these classes obviously 
furthers scholarship, but these classes seem to be a rather narrow exception. 
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them from sincerely delving into other viewpoints so long as the 
professor presents other views in the best light possible.133 Thus, 
professors would be able to voice their own opinions in a manner 
that is less likely to indoctrinate and limit the viewpoints available to 
their students. Such a situation should also advance the interests of 
the college that employs the professor. After all, the institution funds 
the professor to research and teach within a specific field.134 By 
allowing a professor to express her findings to her students, a college 
realizes a return on its investment rather than shutting down the very 
speech that it funded the professor to develop in the first place. 
Even if such a scenario is not realized at any given college, and 
the college decides to stifle professors from presenting the fruits of 
their own scholarship (or any other speech) in the classroom, the 
proposed separation between speech related to scholarship and 
speech related to teaching would still allow professors to speak freely 
among themselves. Additionally, it would not prevent students from 
investigating the fruits of their professors’ scholarship on their own. 
In sum, just because a professor’s speech would be protected to a 
lesser degree when she is teaching than when she is participating in 
scholarship does not necessarily mean that she could not use the 
fruits of her scholarship in her teaching. Nor does it mean that her 
students would be deprived of the opportunity to learn from the 
professor’s scholarship if she is prohibited from sharing her 
scholarship with the class—though they might have to do so during 
their free time. 
B. Without Free Speech in Teaching, Students Will be Deprived of 
Cutting-Edge Subjects 
Another argument presented by several courts135 and scholars is 
that Garcetti cannot govern speech related to teaching because such 
governance would deprive college students of receiving the cutting-
 
 133. Students may still parrot the professor’s ideas in class and on exams, but at least they 
would be exposed to other ideas. 
 134. Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the Public University, 22 
BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 64 (2004) (“[Professors] are paid to develop theories and to speak, 
write, and teach about their intellectual labors in all stages of the creation, dissemination, and 
reformulation of those ideas.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Teachers and 
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/22/2015 4:01 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1012 
edge information they need and pay for. These critics argue that 
without some First Amendment protection from their employing 
universities, professors would be too worried about being disciplined 
for unpopular speech to address any controversial or cutting-edge 
issues in the classroom.136 However, it is in the best interest of colleges 
and universities to allow their professors to discuss these cutting-edge 
issues in class. Students often choose to attend particular colleges 
precisely because those colleges—or even specific professors—have a 
reputation for delving into cutting-edge subjects.137 If a college gains a 
reputation for forbidding or ignoring such subjects, its academic 
reputation would likely diminish and enrollment (or the quality of 
students who do enroll) would likely decline as potential students 
choose to attend schools that address those subjects. Additionally, the 
separate treatment of classroom speech and scholarship would allow 
professors to continue to obtain cutting-edge information and provide 
them the opportunity to persuade their schools to teach that 
information without fear of retaliation. 
On a related note, some post-Garcetti cases arise from a 
professor’s criticism of the administration of the college or university 
made in his or her capacity as a professor.138 This kind of speech is 
not the cutting-edge or educational material that the courts are so 
eager to protect in the classroom and, therefore, it does not deserve 
added protection within the classroom. However, by exempting 
scholarship from the Garcetti rule, such speech would still be 
protected when it is addressed to other professors or administrators, 
a result that seems justifiable and fair. 
C. The Government Funds Professors to be Private Speakers 
The final criticism against the proposed solution is that collegiate 
professors should not be considered public employees for Garcetti 
purposes because they are funded by the government to promote  
 
 
 136. See, e.g., supra note 53. 
 137. Robert Morse, Students Say College Rankings Aren’t Most Important Part of 
Decision, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-
rankings-blog/2010/02/04/students-say-college-rankings-arent-most-important-part-of-
decision (noting that a national survey of incoming Freshmen revealed that 63.6% of students 
listed that it was “very important” that the college they chose had a very good academic 
reputation, the highest such percentage of any criteria listed on the survey). 
 138. See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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private messages. The general argument is summarized by one scholar 
as follows: 
[C]ontrary to Garcetti, an academic’s status as a public employee is 
more similar to the public funding of lawyers described in 
Velazquez, where the government provided federal funding to 
lawyers offering free legal services to indigent clients. The Court 
explained that the lawyers receiving the government funding were 
not speaking as agents of the government because Congress gave 
the money to the lawyers to convey private messages. Academics 
employed by public universities are also not speaking as agents of 
the government because the university provides them with a salary 
to convey private messages in the form of their scholarship.139 
It is true that the government funds professors’ scholarship and it 
is also true that universities are different from other governmental 
agencies, but these facts actually seem to cut against the idea that all 
professional academic speech should be exempted from the Garcetti 
rule. For example, because universities are different from other 
governmental agencies, funding from the two sources should 
arguably be treated differently as well. Regarding professors’ speech, 
the funding for scholarship often comes from outside agencies 
whereas the funding for teaching comes primarily from the university 
itself.140 This seems to indicate that although the government may 
fund professors to be private citizens in scholarship settings, 
professors are still the agents of the university while teaching. That 
professors are agents of their employing university while teaching 
seems correct because, as noted above,141 a university is largely 
dependent upon the quality and content of its professors’ classroom 
speech and because universities ultimately control the curriculum. 
Therefore, it is completely logical to allow the college to closely 
monitor classroom speech without fear of judicial retribution. 
Consequently, even if one accepts the argument that the government 
funding provided to professors simply promotes their private 
 
 139. Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1230. Beckstrom also emphasizes that colleges are 
different than other governmental agencies. This difference stems from the fact that “[w]hen 
students attend a public university, they enter with the intent to receive an education. The 
university serves as a marketplace of ideas.” Id. 
 140. This does, however, depend largely on the discipline. Most scientific and 
engineering research is funded by outside grants. Humanities and law, by contrast, do not 
usually involve much outside funding. 
 141. See supra Part V.B. 
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messages, the relevant funding primarily promotes speech that is 
related to scholarship,142 not speech related to teaching. This result 
further endorses the separate treatment of the two types of speech. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Due to their unique role as the primary recipient of speech 
related to teaching, students deserve special attention when 
determining how much First Amendment protection public 
professors should receive while performing their official duties. This 
Note has demonstrated that when such attention is paid to the role 
students play in the classroom, it becomes evident that the Garcetti 
rule should govern professional speech related to teaching but not 
professional speech related to scholarship. 
Aaron Worthen* 
 
 
 142. Indeed, even the author of the criticism itself refers to a professor’s private message 
as “scholarship.” Beckstrom, supra note 53, at 1228. 
* J.D., 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
